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This Note argues that U.S. courts should allow foreign states to raise substantive defenses
when using Rule 60(b)(4) to challenge the courts’ jurisdiction to enter a default judg- ment. Part
I of this Note analyzes the FSIA and relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Part II analyzes
the conflicting views on whether to consider substantive defenses in deter- mining subject matter
jurisdiction. Part III argues that in the context of FSIA actions the use of substantive defenses
under Rule 60(b)(4) is not only workable, but more desirable than the use of Rule 60(b)(6) judicial
discretion. This Note concludes that the consideration of substantive defenses under Rule 60(b)(4)
is necessary to fulfill the congressional intent behind the FSIA.
BROKERING A DIFFICULT MARRIAGE: SUBSTANTIVE
DEFENSES UNDER RULE 60(b)(4) RELIEF FROM




The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the "FSIA" or the
"Act")I provides foreign states2 with broad immunity from suit
brought in the United States.' The FSIA encompasses both
procedural and substantive provisions.4 While the FSIA is pri-
marily a procedural act that grants U.S. courts subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign states under limited circumstances, it
also contains provisions that require analysis of substantive
legal principles. 5 Because the procedural and substantive pro-
visions of the FSIA are intertwined, at times U.S. courts may be
required to consider the merits of the underlying action to de-
termine whether to exercise jurisdiction.6
Foreign states frequently challenge the exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction by a U.S. court by failing to appear.7 When
this occurs, the court enters a default judgment against the for-
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
2. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the "FSIA") defines a foreign!state as
including a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentiality of a
foreign state. Id. § 1603(a).
3. Id. § 1605; see infra note 20 (containing text of section 1605). A foreign state
is not immune from jurisdiction, however, if its action is a "commercial activity" car-
ried on in the United States or if the activity violates international law. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2) (1988).
4. See infra notes 14-32 and accompanying text (discussing history and frame-
work of FSIA).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Bowers v. Transportes Navieros Ecuadorianos, 719 F. Supp. 166
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (determining whether steamship carrier may be considered agent or
instrumentality of foreign state); Hercaire Int'l, Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559, 565
(11 th Cir. 1987) (vacating lower court's holding that Argentina's 100 percent owner-
ship of national airline's stock was sufficient to overcome presumption of separate
juridical existence); see infra note 13 (discussing recurring issues involving laws of
agency, alter ego, and juridical identity).
7. See, e.g., Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 665 F. Supp.
323, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Soviet Union deliberately failed to appear in court after
having received notice and service), aff'd, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1219 (1988); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (Soviet
Union's foreign ministry rejected service while stating its intent not to appear in
court), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1988); Meadows v. Domini-
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eign state.' A problem arises, however, when a foreign state
challenges the validity of the default judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).9 Under this rule, a court may
neither exercise discretion nor consider substantive defenses
when determining the validity of a default judgment.' Ac-
cordingly, some federal courts have denied the use of substan-
tive defenses under Rule 60(b)(4) to foreign states in challeng-
ing courts' jurisdiction to enter a default judgment." Instead
they look to Rule 60(b) (6),12 which permits the use of equitable
discretion, in cases involving foreign states. Other federal
courts, however, permit the use of substantive defenses to
challenge a default judgment based upon the courts' lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.' 3
can Republic, 628 F. Supp. 599, 602 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (Dominican Republic failed to
answer or appear), aft'd, 817 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987).
8. See Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 330 (ordering default judgment because of
deliberate default by defendant).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988). Rule 60(b)(4) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void.
Id. •
10. See infra note 38 (discussing cases supporting judicial parameters of Rule
60(b)(4)).
\11. See, e.g., Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 524 (9th Cir.) (stat-
ing tlajt foreign state may not rely on existence of meritorious defense as basis for
voiding judgment), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987); Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Re-
public of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543, 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (though court concluded that
contract fell within "commercial activity" exception and therefore it could have ana-
lyzed case under Rule 60(b)(4), it instead relieved Bolivia from default judgment
based on Rule 60(b)(6)); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp. 1224, 1236 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (stating that issues of agency, alter ego, and juridical separateness are not open
for consideration after judgment has been entered), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 871 F.2d
1515 (9th Cir. 1988); see infra notes 78-106 and accompanying text (discussing Bancec
approach).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988). Rule 60(b)(6) provides that
[o~n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.
Id.
13. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d
189, 196 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting impossibility of making decision concerning subject
matter jurisdiction without considering substantive law of apparent authority); Hes-
ter Int'l Corp, v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 181 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that Nigerian corporation was not agent or alter ego of Nigeria and hence
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Nigeria); Carl Marks & Co. v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 665 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that
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This Note argues that U.S. courts should allow foreign
states to raise substantive defenses when using Rule 60(b)(4)
to challenge the courts' jurisdiction to enter a default judg-
ment. Part I of this Note analyzes the FSIA and relief from
judgment under Rule 60(b). Part II analyzes the conflicting
views on whether to consider substantive defenses in deter-
mining subject matter jurisdiction. Part III argues that in the
context of FSIA actions the use of substantive defenses under
Rule 60(b)(4) is not only workable, but more desirable than the
use of Rule 60(b)(6) judicial discretion. This Note concludes
that the consideration of substantive defenses under Rule
60(b)(4) is necessary to fulfill the congressional intent behind
the FSIA.
I. RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
1. History of the Act
In the United States the doctrine of sovereign immunity
has undergone a gradual evolution from absolute immunity to
a more restricted form of immunity. 4 Prior to the passage of
the FSIA, the practice of U.S. courts was to rely on the policies
even though court must consider merits before determining jurisdiction, dismissal is
for want ofjurisdiction, not on merits); see infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text
(discussing Verlinden approach).
14. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698
(1976); Note, Prejudgment Attachment of Foreign Sovereign Assets under the Proposed Amend-
ments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 295, 302 (1986). For
broad discussions of foreign sovereign immunity, see C. SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY:
SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (1988);J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVER-
EIGN IMMUNITY (1963).
The current U.S. view of sovereign immunity, embodied in the FSIA, reflects the
view of the "Tate Letter" issued by the U.S. Department of State. See Changed Policy
Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Government, Letter
from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting U.S. Attorney General (May 19, 1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter], re-
printed in Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings]. The Tate Let-
ter was written with a view to conform the U.S. practice of sovereign immunity with
the international legal principle of "restrictive theory" which restricts foreign states'
immunity to cases based on public acts and not private or commercial acts. Id.; see
Hearings, supra, at 26 (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor to U.S. Department
of State).
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and official opinions of the U.S. Department of State in deter-
mining their jurisdiction over foreign states.' 5 The FSIA was
intended to eliminate this practice by giving the judicial branch
the power to determine sovereign immunity, thereby assuring
that such determinations were made on purely legal grounds.' 6
Hence, the broad purposes of the FSIA are to "facilitate and
depoliticize litigation against foreign states in order to mini-
mize tension in foreign relations arising out of such litiga-
tion.""7 The Act sets forth the sole and exclusive standards to
be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity.' 8
2. The Framework of the FSIA
The FSIA begins with a presumption of general immunity
from lawsuits in U.S. courts for foreign states and their agents
or instrumentalities.' 9 This presumption may be overcome
only if claimants allege acts by foreign states that fall under
one of the enumerated exceptions in the Act.20 Thus, if one of
the specified exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, a court
15. Prior to the FSIA, a foreign state defendant could have either litigated a
sovereign immunity defense entirely in court or it could have made a formal diplo-
matic request to have the State Department decide the issue. Hearings, iupra note 14,
at 26. If it chose the latter, the U.S. Department ofJustice, in consultation with the
State Department, would then file with the court a "suggestion of immunity" to
which all U.S. courts deferred. Id.
16. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6605-06. The transfer of power from the execu-
tive branch to the judicial branch also reduces any foreign policy implication of sov-
ereign immunity. Id.
17. Letter of Transmittal from the Department of State and the Department of
Justice to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Oct. 31, 1975), reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6604, 6634 [hereinafter State Department
Letter].
18. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433-
35 (1989) (stating that text and structure of FSIA reflect Congress' intention that
FSIA be sole basis of U.S. courts'jurisdiction); see also Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, 665 F. Supp. 323, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Act is the sole
basis for federal court subject matter and personal jurisdiction over a foreign sover-
eign").
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). Section 1604 reads:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States
except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
Id.
20. Id. § 1605. Section 1605 provides:
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has subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign state.2 t
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case -
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly
or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the
foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of
the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in con-
nection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law
are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property
is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity car-
ried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any
property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is en-
gaged in a commercial activity in the United States;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succes-
sion or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are
in issue;
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by
the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or em-
ployee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to -
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the dis-
cretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
Id.
21. Id. § 1330(a). Section 1330(a) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount
in controversy of any non jury civil action against a foreign state as defined
in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with
respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under
sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agree-
ment.
Id.
In addition, under the FSIA a court has personal jurisdiction over a foreign state
where subject matter jurisdiction exists and service of process has been made. Id.
§ 1330(b). Section 1330(b) reads:
Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for
relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a)
where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.
Id. Section 1330(b) provides, in effect, a federal long-arm statute over foreign states.
See generally George, A Practical and Theoretical Analysis of Service of Process under the For-
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One of the main purposes of the FSIA is to codify a "com-
mercial activity" exception to sovereign acts. 2 Many disputes
that have been decided under the Act involve the so-called "di-
rect effect" clause of the commercial activity exception.23 This
clause provides that an act of a foreign state made in connec-
tion with a commercial activity occurring outside of the United
States which causes a direct effect in the United States confers
subject matter jurisdiction on U.S. courts.2 4
Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense2 5 that must
be specially pleaded, and the foreign state retains the burden
of proof to produce evidence in support of its claim of immu-
nity.26 The foreign state must show that the exceptions to sov-
ereign immunity are not applicable and the court therefore
lacks jurisdiction.27 The burden on the foreign state is height-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 INT'L LAw. 49 (1985) (containing broad discussion of
service of process under FSIA).
22. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6605.
23. See, e.g., America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9th
Cir. 1989); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Zer-
nicek v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043
(1988); Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980); Carey v. Na-
tional Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988). For the various approaches which courts
have used in determining the jurisdictional scope of the commercial activity excep-
tion, see Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne
de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1984). For a broad discussion of
courts' approaches, see Note, EffectsJurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 474 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Effects Juris-
diction].
25. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) lists some of the grounds for affirmative
defense, e.g., accord and satisfaction, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, du-
ress, and failure of consideration. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988). An
affirmative defense is one which serves as a basis for proving some new facts. In such
a defense, the defendant does not simply deny a charge, but offers new evidence to
avoid judgment against him. The defendant must raise the defense in his answer and
he has the burden of proof on defense. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 60 (6th ed.
1990).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 6604, 6616.
27. See id. The foreign state must produce evidence to establish that it, or one of
its instrumentalities, is the defendant in the suit. Id. Further, it must show that the
plaintiff's claim relates to a public act. Id. A public act is one that is not within the
exceptions of sections 1605-1607. Id. If the foreign state makes a prima facie show-
ing of immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the foreign state is
not immune. Id. The foreign state bears the ultimate burden of proving that it is
immune from suit. Id.
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ened by the fact that there is no specific provision in the Act
that permits a court to dismiss even the most frivolous com-
plaints sua sponte.2 8
Several courts have commented on the unusual framework
of the FSIA.2 9 One of the most distinctive features of the FSIA
28. The foreign state is thus limited to two options: either appear in court and
assert a sovereign immunity defense or risk a default judgment. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1608(e) (1988) (allowing court to enter default judgment if claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to court); Note, The Right of Foreign
Sovereigns to Contest Federal Court Jurisdiction Pro Se, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 549, 553
(1988). With respect to the default judgment, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
even if a foreign state does not enter an appearance, a court must still determine that
immunity is unavailable under the Act. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 493 n.20 (1983).
29. See, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). The court stated:
In structure, the FSIA is a marvel of compression. Within the bounds of a
few tersely-worded sections, it purports to provide answers to three crucial
questions in a suit against a foreign state: the availability of sovereign im-
munity as a defense, the presence of subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim, and the propriety of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Through a series of intricately coordinated provisions, the FSIA seems at
first glance to make the answer to one of the questions, subject matter juris-
diction, dispositive of all three.
Id. at 306 (citation omitted).
In Texas Trading, Nigeria repudiated its contracts with cement suppliers by invok-
ing sovereign immunity. Id. at 303-06. The court first analyzed the meaning of
"commercial activity" by using sources from the legislative history, case law prior to
the passage of the Act, and current international law concerning sovereign immunity.
See id. at 307-08. The court turned to the analysis of subject matter and personal
jurisdictions after having determined that Nigeria's activity constituted commercial
activity. See id. at 308. The court then reversed the lower court's dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction based on section 1605(a)(2). Id. at 313.
One court has criticized harshly the structure of the FSIA as being poorly con-
ceived and drafted. See Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
stated that the FSIA is a
statutory labyrinth that, owing to the numerous interpretive questions en-
gendered by its bizarre structure and its many deliberately vague provisions,
has during its brief lifetime been a financial boon for the private bar but a
constant bane of the federal judiciary.
Id. In Gibbons, the Republic of Ireland was sued for breach of contract, fraud, and
tortious interference with contractual relations. Id. at 1104. The court found subject
matter and personal jurisdiction over Ireland. Id. at 1125; see Vencedora Oceanica
Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195,
205 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The FSIA presents a peculiarly twisted exercise in statutory
draftsmanship."); Transmerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d
998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The problem, as the drafters of the FSIA themselves
admitted, is that the statute is vaguely worded and offers little guidance to courts
construing its terms."). In Vencedora, the court held that the commercial activity ex-
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is the coalescence of jurisdictional and substantive issues.30 In
order to reach a decision on subject matter jurisdiction, a court
may need to interpret the immunity law issues as well as the
substantive law of agency, juridical identity, or alter ego.3 '
Moreover, certain definitions under the FSIA are so laden with
substantive principles that the court may be required to ex-
amine the underlying substantive meanings. 2
B. Relief From Judgment Under Rule 60(b)
Rule 60(b)3 3 represents the balancing of two counter-
ception did not apply due to a lack of connection between the activity and the United
States. Vencedora, 730 F.2d at 200-02. The court proceeded by surveying approaches
utilized by various courts. Id. See generally Hearings, supra note 14.
30. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a)-(b) & 1603(b) (1988); see also Upton v. Empire of
Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 265 (D.D.C. 1978) (stating that FSIA "creates an identity of
substance and procedure"), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Hearings, supra
note 14, at 86 (comment by Cecil Olmstead that limitations on sovereign immunity
constitute substantive matter); infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text (discussing
Verlinden approach).
31. See, e.g., Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629
F.2d 786, 790-91 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Statement of
Interest to Set Aside Default Judgment Against China Filed in the Jackson v. People's Repub-
lic of China Case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, 22 I.L.M.
1077 (1983) [hereinafter Statement of United States]; see infra notes 56-123 (discussing
U.S. courts' approaches).
32. See, e.g., Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (determin-
ing that FSIA, and definitions thereunder, "apply to individual defendants when they
are sued in their official capacity"); Republic of Phillipines v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp.
793, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that terms "agency," "instrumentality," "entity,"
or "organ" were not intended to apply to natural persons).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988). Rule 60(b) reads:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresen-
tation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judg-
ment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2),
and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken.
Id.
The present Rule 60(b) has undergone several changes. The original Rule 60(b)
stated only one ground for relief from judgment. In 1945, two new grounds were
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vailing policies: the desire to achieve finality in litigation and
the desire to achieve justice through full consideration of the
merits. 4 Rule 60(b) grants courts broad power to set aside a
judgment and to deny or grant relief in light of the particular
circumstances of the case.3 5 The courts, moreover, tend to ap-
ply the rule even more liberally than usual when a default judg-
ment is involved.3 6
1. Rule 60(b)(4): Challenging the Validity of the Judgment
Rule 60(b)(4) authorizes courts to grant relief from void
judgments. 7 A motion under Rule 60(b)(4) differs markedly
from motions under other clauses of Rule 60(b): courts may
not exercise discretion to deny a motion under Rule 60(b)(4)
when voidness is established, and the moving party need not
added (reasons (2) and (3)). Finally, in 1946 the last three grounds were added. See
generally 7J. MOORE &J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 60.18, 60.25, 60.27
(2d ed. 1987); Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief From Civil Judgments, 61 YALE L.J. 76
(1952); Commentary, Effect of Rule 60(b) on the Other Methods of Relief Front Judgment, 4
Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 942 (1941).
34. See, e.g., Spann v. Commissioners of D.C., 443 F.2d 715, 716 n.I (D.C. Cir.
1970) ("Although relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary.., we think that the liberal
spirit of the rule, together with the basic policy favoring resolution of litigation on
the merits requires us to review closely the exercise of that discretion . . . where
denial of the motion has precluded consideration of the merits . . ."); Russell v. Cun-
ningham, 279 F.2d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 1960) ("policy of the law is to favor a hearing
of a litigant's claim on the merits"); see also 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2857, at 159-60, §§ 2862-64, at 197-221 (1973).
35. FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988); see Klapprott v. United States,
335 U.S. 601, 609 (1949) (stating that "in some respects, the amended rule grants
courts a broader power to set aside judgments than did the old rule").
36. See Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974). In that case,
the court noted that discretion to vacate a defaultjudgment is limited by three impor-
tant policy considerations: first, Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature and must be liber-
ally applied; second, default judgments are generally disfavored and whenever it is
reasonably possible, cases should be decided on their merits; and third, where a de-
fendant seeks timely relief from the judgment and has a meritorious defense, doubt,
if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment. Id.; Gre-
gorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1523 (9th Cir. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS tit. A & § 65 (1986); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 459 comment c (1986); E. SMITH, CYCLOPEDIA OF FED-
ERAL PROCEDURE ch. 30 (3d ed. 1988).
37. FED. R. CIv. P. 60 (b)(4), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988). For the text of Rule
60(b)(4), see supra note 9. A void judgment differs from a valid judgment in that a
void judgment is not legally binding. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438
(1940) ("action of the ... [clourt was . . . beyond its power, [is] void, and subject to
collateral attack");Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1974) ("void judg-
ment is a legal nullity"); see alsoJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS, supra note 33, at 223.
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show a meritorious defense. 8 The courts have narrowly con-
strued the concept of void judgment.3 9 Typically, a judgment
is void if the court that rendered it lacked personal or subject
matter jurisdiction, or violated a party's due process rights.40
A defendant who believes the court lacks either subject matter
jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction may refrain from appear-
ing in court.4 ' If the court enters a default judgment, a foreign
defendant may make a 60(b)(4) motion; if the motion is de-
nied, the foreign state would ordinarily be deemed to forfeit its
right to defend on the merits.42 Accordingly, a default judg-
38. See Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp. 1224, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (stating
that subsection (4) of Rule 60(b) does not give court discretion since validity of deci-
sion hinges on legal determination); see also Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410, 414
(8th Cir. 1955) ("if [plaintiff] can sustain the claim she has presented by strong and
convincing evidence that the default judgment against her is void on the ground as-
serted, section 60(b) requires the court to accord her relief from it"); Schwarz v.
Thomas, 222 F.2d 305, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (quoting Wise v. Herzog, 114 F.2d 486,
492 (D.C. Cir. 1940)) ("No showing of merits is necessary in support of a motion to
vacate a void judgment."); J. MOORE &J. LuCAS, supra note 33, at 224-25; C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 34, at 197-98.
39. See J. MOORE & J. LucAs, supra note 33, at 225. But see Hicklin, 226 F.2d at
413 (noting that "mandate the rule imposes on the court to relieve a party from a
judgment 'for the reason the judgment is void' is broad and unqualified and contains
no restrictions in respect to any of the reasons that may be shown to render the
judgment void").
40. See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938). The Supreme Court
stated that
a court must have the power to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction
of the person of a litigant, or whether its geographical jurisdiction covers
the place of the occurrence under consideration. Every court in rendering a
judgment, tacitly, if not expressly, determines its jurisdiction over the par-
ties and the subject matter.
d. (footnotes omitted); Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624
F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Absence of subject matter jurisdiction may, in certain
cases, render a judgment void."); Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir.
1949) (stating that judgment is void for violation of due process where defendant did
not know case had been called for trial). A judgment is not void, however, merely
because it is an erroneous exercise ofjurisdiction. A total want of jurisdiction must
be distinguished from an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. See Stoll, 305 U.S. at
171-72; Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys., 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972).
41. This exposes the defendant to the risk of a default judgment. See Practical
Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543, 1547 (D.C. Cir. 1987). How-
ever, when enforcement of the default judgment is attempted, the defendant may
assert his jurisdictional objection. Id.; see Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982) ("A defendant is always free to
ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and then challenge that
judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.").
42. See Practical Concepts, 811 F.2d at 1547. The court's determination that it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter is res judicata if the jurisdictional question was
225
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ment, which by definition is a judgment rendered without any
appearance in court by the defendant, 43 presents an unusual
problem for the court in deciding a jurisdictional issue in the
context of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion.44 In the final analysis, for-
eign states in FSIA actions may attempt to void a default judg-
ment for a court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction even when
they fail to appear.
2. Rule 60(b)(6): The Grand Reservoir of Equitable Power
Rule 60(b)(6) grants courts discretion to relieve a party
from a final judgment, order or proceeding for "[a]ny other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 45
Because the motion is addressed solely to the discretion of the
court, the rule has been called the "grand reservoir of equita-
ble power. ' ' 4 6 The rule thus broadens the grounds for relief
from judgment by giving courts more flexibility and power to
vacate judgments whenever necessary to accomplish justice.4 7
The discretion of a court to grant relief under Rule
60(b)(6) is not, however, unlimited. 48 The motion for relief
actually litigated and decided or if the defendant had an opportunity to contest sub-
ject matter jurisdiction but failed to do so. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Bax-
ter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 375 (1940) ("[parties] had full opportunity to present
any objections to the proceeding .. .[but] [a]pparently no question of validity was
raised"). See generally Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack, 40 COLUM.
L. REV. 1006 (1940).
43. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead, answer, or otherwise defend, that party is in default and a judgment
by default may be entered. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 417-18 (6th ed. 1990).
44. See supra note 36 (discussing vacating default judgments).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988).
46. Radack v. Norwegian Am. Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir.
1963).
47. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949). In this case, the
U.S. Supreme Court held:
[Rule] 60(b) strongly indicates on its face that courts no longer are to be
hemmed in by the uncertain boundaries of these and other common law
remedial tools. In simple English, the language of the "other reason"
clause, for all reasons except the five particularly specified, vests power in
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is
appropriate to accomplish justice.
Id.; Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1968) ("The broad language
of clause (6) gives the court ample power to vacate judgments whenever such action
is appropriate to accomplish justice.").
48. See William Skillings & Assocs. v. Cunard Transp., Ltd., 594 F.2d 1078, 1081
(5th Cir. 1979) (stating that Rule 60(b)(6) is unavailable when relief sought is within
coverage of some other provision of Rule 60(b)); De Filippis v. United States, 567
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must be based upon some grounds other than those grounds
stated in the rest of Rule 60(b).49 Furthermore, Rule 60(b)(6)
applies only to extraordinary circumstances. 50 Courts have de-
fined extraordinary circumstances on a case-by-case basis. 5'
In light of the nature of Rule 60(b)(6) as an extraordinary
remedy, the courts must exercise due discretion in applying
the rule.52 Because courts analyze the circumstances of each
case individually, the courts are faced with the problem of de-
veloping standards to define extraordinary circumstances.53
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided no clear gui-
dance as to when a party may avail itself of Rule 60(b)(6). 54 A
F.2d 341, 343 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that government is precluded from simultane-
ously invoking subsections (b)(5) and (b)(6)); see alsoJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS, supra note
33, at 266. In addition, even though there is no time limit for relief under Rule
60(b)(6), the motion must be made within a reasonable time. Id. at 268.
49. See Carr v. District of Columbia, 543 F.2d 917, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Rule
60(b)(6) and the other clauses are mutually exclusive; Rule 60(b)(6) relief cannot be
had if it would have been available under the other grounds. See C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 34, at 217.
50. See Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 613-14; see also Ackermann v. United States, 340
U.S. 193, 202 (1950); Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. Alker, 234 F.2d 113, 116-17 (3d
Cir. 1956) ("It is clear that ... an application for extraordinary relief must be fully
substantiated by adequate proof and its exceptional character must be clearly estab-
lished.").
51. See, e.g., United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that
failure of defendant's counsel to oppose motion for summary judgment due to
mental disorder was sufficient to warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6)). But see Ben
Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 1977) (stat-
ing that gross negligence of freely chosen counsel is negligence of client and there-
fore Rule 60(b)(6) is not applicable).
52. This is especially true since the district court's power is buttressed by the
fact that appellate review is limited to the abuse of discretion standard. See Seven
Elves v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that review is limited to
"whether the district court's refusal to tap that reservoir in the present case was so
unwarranted as to justify reversal"). On appeal, factual findings of the district court
under Rule 60(b)(6) are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Hester Int'l Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1989); Meadows v. Domini-
can Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1987).
53. See infra notes 54-55 (discussing leading cases on extraordinary circum-
stances).
54. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949); see also Ackermann v.
United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950). One commentator has observed that "[a]s with
so much of procedural law, any discussion of the limits of the authority of the district
court to vacate a final judgment on motion made under Rule 60(b)(6) must proceed
with relatively little guidance from authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court." J.
MOORE &J. LUCAS, supra note 33, at 274.
In Klapprott v. United States, the situation involved a denaturalization proceeding
depriving the petitioner of his citizenship which had taken more than four years prior
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general consensus, however, is that Rule 60(b)(6) should be
invoked only to prevent extreme hardship or injustice.55 In the
final analysis, the use of Rule 60(b)(6) has been somewhat in-
consistent because of doubt about when and how it applies.
II. APPROACHES ADOPTED BY COURTS IN
DETERMINING RELIEF FROM DEFAULT
JUDGMENTS IN FSIA ACTIONS
The lower federal courts have been divided on whether
substantive defenses should be considered in a Rule 60(b)(4)
motion.56 The disagreement results from the lower courts'
readings of the Supreme Court's interpretations of substantive
law issues under the FSIA."7 In First National City Bank v. Banco
Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba ("Bancec"),5 a the Supreme
Court ruled that the FSIA was primarily a jurisdictional instru-
ment and therefore was not intended to affect the substantive
law determining the liability of a foreign state or the attribu-
tion of liability among instrumentalities of a foreign state.59
In Bancec, the assets of First National City Bank ("Ci-
tibank") were seized and nationalized during the Cuban
Revolution.60 Prior to the Revolution, Bancec had sought to
to the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The Court, in rejecting the government's contention
that the petitioner's act was nothing more than "excusable neglect," held that the
fact that during the course of the denaturalization proceedings petitioner was held
continuously in federal prisons supported petitioner's claim that he was deprived of
any reasonable opportunity to make a defense. Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 613-14.
In Ackermann v. United States, the Court, in denying the Rule 60(b)(6) relief, distin-
guished the facts of the case from those in Klapprott by pointing out that petitioner
had made a free, calculated, and deliberate choice not to appeal, whereas Klapprott
had had no choice whatsoever regarding his actions. Ackermann, 340 U.S. at 200.
55. See Klapprott, 335 U.S. 601; Transit Casualty Co. v. Security Trust Co., 441
F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that courts can invoke Rule 60(b)(6) to prevent
extreme hardship). One student commentator has remarked, however, that
"[v]irtually all courts pay lip service to the 'extraordinary circumstances' doctrine."
Comment, Equitable Power of a Federal Court to Vacate a Final Judgment for "Any Other
Reason Justifying Relief"--Rule 60(b)(6), 33 Mo. L. REV. 427, 438 (1968); see Wham,
Federal District Court Rule 60(b): A Humane Rule Gone Wrong, 49 A.B.A. J. 566 (1963).
56. See infra notes 78-123 and accompanying text (discussing two approaches to
60(b)(4) substantive defense analysis).
57. Compare infra notes 78-106 and accompanying text with notes 107-23 and
accompanying text (discussing disagreement resulting from Supreme Court's incon-
sistent treatments of Bancec and Verlinden).
58. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
59. Id. at 620.
60. Id. at 614-15.
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collect on a letter of credit issued by Citibank in its favor.6'
Subsequently Bancec brought suit on the letter of credit in a
U.S. federal court against Citibank, which counterclaimed by
asserting a right to set off the value of its seized assets.62 The
district court dismissed the complaint by stating that Bancec
was an alter ego of the Cuban government and thus immune
from suit in a U.S. court.63 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, holding that Bancec was not an alter
ego for the purpose of Citibank's setoff counterclaim. 64 The
court further stated that it would respect the independent
identity of a governmental instrumentality created as "a sepa-
rate and distinct juridical entity under the laws of the state that
owns it."
65
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Bancec's assertion that
the FSIA substantively prohibits the Court from holding
Bancec responsible for action taken by the Cuban govern-
ment. 66 The Supreme Court held that the FSIA did not affect
the determination of whether Citibank may set off against
Bancec's claim.67 The Court relied on international law and
federal common law in holding against Bancec. 68 The
Supreme Court in Bancec thus treated the issues of juridical
separateness and alter ego as a matter of substantive law, not
subject matter jurisdiction.69
In Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria,7° the plaintiff, a
Dutch corporation, sued an instrumentality of Nigeria by alleg-
ing breach of a letter of credit. 7' The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that neither the diversity clause nor
the "arising under" clause of article III of the U.S. Constitu-
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Banco National de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
64. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d
913, 920 (2d Cir. 1981), rev d, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
65. Id.
66. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 619 (1983).
67. Id. at 620.
68. Id. at 621-34.
69. Id.
70. 461 U.S. 479 (1983).
71. Id. at 482-83.
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tion is broad enough to support jurisdiction over actions by
foreign plaintiffs against foreign states.72 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the FSIA was not limited to actions
brought by U.S. citizens. 3 The Court, in analyzing the scope
of the FSIA, stated that federal courts, in determining their ju-
risdiction over foreign states, must apply the detailed federal
law standards set forth in the Act.7 4 However, because subject
matter jurisdiction in an FSIA action depends on the existence
of substantive exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity, suits
against foreign states necessarily raise issues of substantive
federal law.75
Even though neither Bancec nor Verlinden involved Rule
60(b)(4), 7 6 they have had far-reaching effects on subsequent
lower court decisions involving the issue of whether a foreign
state may raise a substantive defense in seeking relief under
Rule 60(b)(4).7 7 The different approaches used by the lower
courts may be analyzed in terms of which of the two ap-
proaches they follow, the Bancec approach or the Verlinden ap-
proach.
A. The Bancec Approach
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Mead-
ows v. Dominican Republic,78 closely following the Supreme
72. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 325-28 (2d Cir.
1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 479 (1983).
73. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 479, 489-91 (1983).
74. Id. at 493-94 (stating that "suit against a foreign state under this Act neces-
sarily raises questions of substantive federal law at the very outset [and] . . . [a]t the
threshold of every action in a district court against a foreign state ... the court must
satisfy itself that one of the exceptions applies-and in doing so it must apply the
detailed federal law standards set forth in the Act").
75. Id. at 493; see Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 681 F. Supp.
371, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
76. Bancec involved the nationalization of foreign assets by the Cuban govern-
ment. See First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611 (1983). Verlinden, on the other hand, involved the issue of whether the FSIA
is broad enough to permit actions by foreign plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns. See
Verlinden, 461 U.S. 479.
77. Since Bancec and Verlinden, lower federal courts have utilized the Supreme
Court's analyses in those cases to support their opinions. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank
v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989); Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 616 F. Supp. 660,
666 (D.C. Mich. 1985); infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
78. 817 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Court's analysis in Bancec,79 held that the issue of separate ju-
ridical entity was a question of substantive law.80 The republic
and its instrumentality therefore were precluded from relying
on the existence of a meritorious defense as the basis for a mo-
tion to void the default judgment.8" In Meadows, the plaintiffs
were retained to procure a loan for the Republic and the In-
stituto de Auxilios y Viviendas (the "Instituto"), a Dominican instru-
mentality, by an individual who was both secretary of the Re-
public and the administrator of the Instituto.82 The plaintiffs
successfully procured the loan but were never paid a commis-
sion.8 3 When the defendants failed to respond after several at-
tempts were made to serve a summons and complaint, the
court entered a default judgment.8 4
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's determina-
tion that it had jurisdiction over both the republic and the In-
stituto.s5 The court determined that the act of obtaining a loan
commitment was within the commercial activity exception to
the FSIA.86 The defendants asserted, however, that because
the Instituto was an autonomous juridical entity the republic
could not be held liable for the Instituto's commercial activity.8 7
The court rejected the defendants' argument that juridical sep-
arateness goes to subject matter jurisdiction as inconsistent
with Bancec.8 s
In Gregorian v. Izvestia,s° the Ninth Circuit avoided the tasks
of analyzing the substantive-jurisdictional issues.9 0 In Grego-
rian, a U.S. exporter of medical equipment sued the defend-
79. Id. at 524.
80. Id. In denying the Dominican Republic's argument that juridical separate-
ness goes to subject matter jurisdiction and thus may be raised at any time, the Ninth
Circuit held that the argument was inconsistent with "settled legal principles" that
may be found in Bancec. Id.
81. id.
82. Id. at 519-20.
83. Id. at 519.
84. Id. at 520.
85. Id. at 522.
86. Id. at 522-23.
87. Id. at 524.
88. Id. The court reasoned that the issue of separate juridical identity is a ques-
tion of substantive law, not subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The court defined sub-
stantive law as "the basic law of rights and duties," and the law of jurisdiction as
procedural law. Id.
89. 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1989).
90. See id. at 1526.
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ants, Soviet foreign trading organizations, alleging breach of
contract and libel." The plaintiff won a default judgment,9 2
and the defendants moved to set it aside.9 3 The U.S. State De-
partment, as amicus curiae, urged the court to consider the Sovi-
ets' defenses on the merits.94 The Ninth Circuit, citing the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Jackson v. People's Republic of
China,95 nevertheless held that the defendants were entitled to
equitable relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 96 The court did not at-
tempt to address the issue of a substantive defense raised in
the defendant's Rule 60(b)(4) motion.97 Instead, the court uti-
lized Rule 60(b)(6) to reverse the district court's decision.98
Because it reversed the lower court's Rule 60(b)(6) holding,
the court ruled out the necessity of analyzing Rule 60(b)(4).§9
Unlike the court in Jackson, however, the Ninth Circuit in
Gregorian contended that the existence of extraordinary circum-
stances was not the standard under Rule 60(b)(6).' 0 0 Instead,
the court used a three-part test formulated in Meadows. t01 The
court held that a foreign sovereign defendant's reasonable be-
lief that it is immune from an FSIA suit may not be character-
91. Id. at 1516-17.
92. Id. at 1518.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1524.
95. 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986).
96. Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1525-26 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth
Circuit misstated Jackson when it contended thatJackson provided authority against a
finding of "culpable conduct" in that case. Id. The thrust of Jackson was the balanc-
ing of all interests, especially the personal involvement in the litigation by the head of
state. See Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1495-96.
97. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1526.
98. Id. at 1522-26.
99. Id. at 1526. But see supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text (discussing
principle that court should exhaust every other remedy before turning to Rule
60(b)(6)).
100. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1526; seeJackson v. People's Republic of China, 794
F.2d 1490, 1494-95 (11 th Cir. 1986). Even though the Ninth Circuit in Gregorian
cited Jackson for support, the standards used by the two courts were quite different.
Jackson is the leading case on the use of the extraordinary circumstances standard in
the context of FSIA actions; on the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in Gregorian sup-
planted the extraordinary circumstances analysis with a three-part test. See Gregorian,
871 F.2d at 1526.
101. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1523. In Gregorian, the Ninth Circuit held that a Rule
60(b) motion to vacate a default judgment will be denied if: (1) plaintiff would be
prejudiced ifjudgment is set aside, (2) defendant has no meritorious defense, or (3)
defendant's culpable conduct led to the default. Id.
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ized as "culpable conduct."' 0 2
Meadows, and to some extent Gregorian, exemplify the lit-
eral readings of Bancec that fail to take into account the lan-
guage in Verlinden. The Ninth Circuit, by foregoing Rule
60(b)(4), avoided any analysis of substantive issues in Grego-
rian. 0 3 It preferred the equitable approach of Rule 60(b)(6) to
a legal remedy under-Rule 60(b)(4). °4 Ironically, because no
inquiry as to substantive defenses is required under Rule
60(b)(4), the court's other alternative is to turn to the equita-
ble reservoir of Rule 60(b)(6). °5 Other courts, however, are
more amenable to the use of substantive defenses in Rule
60(b)(4).10 6
B. The Verlinden Approach
Some courts that have considered Rule 60(b)(4) in the
context of FSIA proceedings have expressed their discontent
over an apparent mismatch between the FSIA and the rule.107
In First Fidelity Bank v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda,10 8 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed that it is
impossible to make a decision concerning subject matter juris-
diction without considering the merits of the case in an FSIA
action.1°9 The Second Circuit thus recognized that in many
FSIA cases a resolution of the substantive immunity law issues
will be required to reach a decision on subject matter jurisdic-
102. Id. at 1525.
103. Id.
104. The Ninth Circuit disregarded the extensive analysis of Rule 60(b)(4) by
the district court in formulating its own interpretation of Rule 60(b)(6). See id. at
1523. For the district court's analysis of Rule 60(b)(4), see Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658
F. Supp. 1224, 1229-36 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
105. See supra notes 78-99 and accompanying text (discussing courts that follow
Bancec).
106. See infra note 107-23 and accompanying text (discussing other jurisdictions
that permit use of substantive defenses under Rule 60(b)(4)).
107. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d
189, 195-96 (2d Cir. 1989); Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
665 F. Supp. 323, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
108. 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).
109. Id. at 196. In First Fidelity Bank, the Second Circuit vacated the default
judgment and remanded to the district court, holding that Antigua should have an
opportunity to defend the case on the merits, d. The Second Circuit, after being
unable to resolve the issue based on Rule 60(b)(4), turned to Rule 60(b)(6) but to no
avail since the fusion of substantive and jurisdictional issues "also militates in favor of
setting aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6)." Id.
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tion. 110
In First Fidelity Bank, Jacobs, an ambassador of Antigua,
borrowed money from the plaintiffs, allegedly on behalf of the
Government of Antigua, and later failed to repay the loan."'
Subsequently, he agreed to settle and signed a consent order,
again purportedly on Antigua's behalf, waiving Antigua's sov-
ereign immunity." 2 In its motion to dismiss the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Antigua argued that it was
not bound byJacobs' actions because he had acted without au-
thority in borrowing the money and in consenting to the settle-
ment. " The issue became whether Jacobs, as Antigua's am-
bassador, possessed the apparent authority to borrow the loan
and to waive Antigua's sovereign immunity under the circum-
stances.'"' The Second Circuit remarked that in order for the
FSIA's commercial activity exception to apply, it must first de-
cide whether an agency relationship existed between Jacobs
and Antigua.' 5 In effect, if Antigua had simply tried to disown
its agent the exception would apply and the court could exer-
cise subject matter jurisdiction." 6 If Antigua, on the other
hand, was merely an innocent victim of its ambassador's fraud,
then it would be immune from suit." 7
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Hester International Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria ' '8 was faced
with the question of whether or not NGPC, a government-cre-
ated Nigerian corporation, was an agent or alter ego of Nige-
ria.' 9 In Hester, the plaintiff entered into a contract with a
Nigerian political unit and NGPC to establish a rice farm in
Nigeria.' 20 The project failed and the plaintiff sued Nigeria for
breach of contract.' 2' The Fifth Circuit, in upholding the dis-
trict court's holding that NGPC was not an agent of Nigeria,
110. Id. at 195-96.
111. Id. at 191.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 193.
115. Id. at 194-95.
116. Id. at 195-96.
117. Id. at 195.
118. 879 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1989).
119. Id. at 175-81.
120. Id. at 171-72.
121. Id.
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affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 122
In the process, the court engaged in a detailed analysis of the
law of agency as a possible substantive defense to the district
court's jurisdiction. 23 Both approaches attempt to overcome
the complexity of the "jurisdictional" provisions in the FSIA.
Whereas the Ninth Circuit adheres closely to Bancec's teaching,
the Second Circuit follows a broader Verlinden approach.
III. THE USE OF SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSES IS PROPER
AND DESIRABLE
A. The Need to Deemphasize Rule 60(b)(6)
The current state of the law with respect to the applicabil-
ity of Rule 60(b)(4) and (6) to the FSIA is afflicted by a lack of
uniformity and clarity. While many courts recognize that con-
sideration of substantive defenses under Rule 60(b)(4) is inevi-
table, some courts have relied almost exclusively on Rule
60(b)(6) in setting aside default judgments.' 24 In spite of the
suitability of Rule 60(b)(4) as to foreign states' jurisdictional
defenses, the courts prefer to approach the problem through
equitable discretion under Rule 60(b)(6).25
For example, in Gregorian, the causes of action involved li-
bel and breach of contract that arose when a Soviet newspaper
published a libelous article against the plaintiff, a U.S. corpora-
tion. 12 6 Rather than deciding the case on the basis of the dis-
trict court's finding of subject matter jurisdiction based on the
"direct effect" clause, the Ninth Circuit instead relied on the
defendant's lack of culpability under the rubric of Rule
60(b)(6). 127
122. Id. at 181.
123. Id. at 176-81.
124. See supra notes 78-106 and accompanying text (discussing cases that follow
Bancec approach). The courts, in considering equitable discretion under Rule
60(b)(6), point to one of the underlying policies under the FSIA that disputes be
resolved on the basis of all relevant legal arguments. Consequently, the courts read
Rule 60(b)(6) and the policy together in justifying their holdings while overlooking
jurisdictional arguments under Rule 60(b)(4). See Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d
1515, 1523-26 (9th Cir. 1989); supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text (discussing
Gregorian).
125. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1523-26.
126. Id. at 1516.
127. Id. at 1523-26.
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In Practical Concepts v. Republic of Bolivia,128 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the
default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). 129 The court relied on
Rule 60(b)(6) in spite of earlier having found the contract be-
tween the plaintiffs and the Republic of Bolivia to fall within
the commercial activity exception.13 0 The court did not elabo-
rate on how it had reached its conclusion other than stating
that it had found "compelling reasons" to relieve Bolivia from
the default judgment.'13 In the same vein, the Eleventh Circuit
in Jackson did not address the jurisdictional issues raised in set-
ting aside the default judgment on the grounds of extraordi-
nary circumstances. 3 2
This approach emphasizes the application of Rule
60(b)(6), with its elusive standard of extraordinary circum-
stances, to foreign states in FSIA actions. 1 33 In light of the un-
certainty involved, equitable discretion should not become the
focus of judicial inquiry and determination in an FSIA action.
B. Rule 60(b)(4) and the FSIA: A Proposal
The use of substantive defenses by foreign states to chal-
lenge a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) should be en-
couraged. First, due to the structural complexity of the FSIA,
the courts must be able to effectuate a workable jurisdictional
instrument by adapting Rule 60(b)(4) to the unique jurisdic-
tional framework of the FSIA.' 3 4 Second, in light of congres-
sional desire to encourage foreign states to appear in court,1
35
Rule 60(b)(4) is preferable to Rule 60(b)(6) because Rule
60(b)(4)'s well-defined parameters assure foreign states some
degree of predictability and consistency in the outcome of
128. 811 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
129. Id. at 1548.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11 th Cir.
1986).
133. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text (discussing operation of Rule
60(b)(6)).
134. One court has called the manner in which the FSIA deals with jurisdictional
issues as "remarkably obtuse." Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094,
1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing unu-
sual framework of FSIA).
135. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 29 (discussing congressional intent).
RULE 60(b)(4)
FSIA litigations. 3 6 Furthermore, the congressional intent of
depoliticizing legal disputes in FSIA actions would be realized
by the use of Rule 60(b)(4)."3
The Second Circuit in First Fidelity Bank recognized the
problems caused by the FSIA's inherent inconsistency by re-
fusing to dismiss the complaint under Rule 60(b)(4).' 38 In-
stead, it remanded the case to the lower court for considera-
tion of the defendant's yet unexplored substantive defenses.' 39
The Fifth Circuit, in Hester, similarly reviewed Nigeria's sub-
stantive defenses before reversing the district court's finding of
subject matter jurisdiction. 4 ° Both cases thus emphasized us-
ing Rule 60(b)(4) to implement the FSIA."' Because the an-
swer to the crucial question of the availability of sovereign im-
munity as a defense hinges upon the finding of subject matter
jurisdiction, the task of proving that subject matter jurisdiction
exists becomes the linchpin of every FSIA action. 4 2
Congress, however, intended the FSIA to be merely a stat-
utory skeleton on which the courts are to develop a body of
sovereign immunity law.' 43 Accordingly, in view of the FSIA's
vagueness 144 and the absence of clear guidance by the
Supreme Court, 145 courts should allow substantive defenses to
be raised in determining subject matter jurisdiction for the
136. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 60(b)(4)).
137. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6606; see also Hearings, supra note 14, at 29; State Department
Letter, supra note 17.
138. First Fidelity Bank v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda, 877 F.2d 189,
196 (2d Cir. 1989).
139. See supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text (discussing cases that follow
Verlinden approach).
140. Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 181 (5th
Cir. 1989); supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (discussing analysis in Hester).
141. See First Fidelity Bank, 877 F.2d at 195; Hester, 879 F.2d at 175-76; supra
notes 107-23 and accompanying text (discussing cases that follow Verlinden ap-
proach).
142. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text (discussing Verlinden). The
confusion that arises from the fusion of personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and the availability of sovereign immunity as a defense apparently has not yet
been addressed by the Supreme Court since the issue was first raised in Texas Trading.
See Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
143. See Gibbons, 549 F. Supp. at 1106. See generally Hearings, supra note 14.
144. See supra notes 19-32 and accompanying text (discussing framework of
FSIA).
145. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting
Supreme Court cases).
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purpose of Rule 60(b)(4). 146 As the Fifth Circuit has shown in
Hester, courts could hear substantive arguments from foreign
states at the jurisdictional juncture of the FSIA proceeding
without reaching the ultimate issue on the merits. 147
Furthermore, the drafters of the FSIA, having placed on
the courts a heavy burden of developing a body of law from a
vaguely drafted statute, t4 8 may not have foreseen the jurisdic-
tional consequences that would result from courts' applying
the FSIA exceptions.1 49 Thus the courts, armed with the in-
herent power to interpret a jurisdictional instrument,15 must
devise a means to interpret the FSIA so that the underlying
congressional intent of encouraging foreign states to appear in
U.S. courts will not be defeated. Moreover, in light of foreign
states' burdens of proving sovereign immunity, 151 and the fre-
quency with which foreign states are subject to default judg-
ments, 52 a judicial disallowance of substantive defenses under
Rule 60(b)(4) would place foreign states at an unfair disadvan-
tage and, in effect, penalize them for nonappearance.
Finally, Rule 60(b)(4) would depoliticize legal determina-
tions in FSIA actions. The Bancec approach, because it rejects
substantive defenses, often looks to political factors such as
foreign relations as part of its methodology. 53 Thus, the
courts that follow Bancec do not adhere to the congressional
146. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 60(b)(4)).
147. See Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 176 &
180 n.9 (5th Cir. 1989); supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (discussing Hes-
ter).
148. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 27.
149. See Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1106 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (stating that exceptions "were apparently drafted without any regard for the
jurisdictional consequences that would flow, or would purport to flow, from their
applicability, and all of which present interpretive problems of varying degree of dif-
ficulty").
150. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938) (stating that courts have
power to interpret their jurisdiction); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853
F.2d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[iun the absence of statutory direction, the district
court has considerable discretion in devising the procedure to inquire into the exist-
ence of jurisdiction . . . [i]f the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the mer-
its").
151. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing sovereign immu-
nity as affirmative defense).
152. See supra notes 7 & 8 (citing cases in which foreign states were subject to
default judgment).
153. See supra notes 78-106 and accompanying text (discussing Bancec approach).
RULE 60(b)(4)
mandate that sovereign immunity questions are to be decided
solely on legal grounds. 54 This mandate was affected to as-
sure legal consistency and reduce foreign policy influence. 5 5
A careful review of foreign states' substantive defenses not
only would assure the predictability of the outcome of FSIA
decisions but also reduce the significance of foreign relations
as a factor in judicial determinations of legal disputes.
CONCLUSION
In the interest of encouraging foreign states to make an
appearance in court to defend themselves even after a default
judgment has been entered, it is important that the foreign
states' substantive defenses be reviewed by U.S. courts. In
considering the defenses, moreover, the courts should bear in
mind the overall intent of Congress in transferring the deci-
sion-making process from the executive branch to the judicial
branch. The courts thus should emphasize the legal grounds
under Rule 60(b)(4) over the discretionary grounds of Rule
60(b)(6) because the latter are too prone to influences from
extra-judicial factors such as foreign policy and political envi-
ronment. By allowing foreign states to raise substantive de-
fenses in challenging the validity of jurisdiction, the courts, in
the process, will promote uniformity, consistency, and predict-
ability of FSIA decisions and carry out Congress' intent.
A. John Sutham*
154. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6606.
155. Id.
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